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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent , ) 
vs . ) Case No. 10940 
JAMES E. CAINE, dba CAINE ) 
AGENCY, 
) 
Defendant and Appellant . 
A P P E L L A N T S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO THE ASSOCIATE 
JUSTICES O F THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The Pe t i t ioner respect fu l ly r eques t s a r ehea r ing in the above 
ent i t led cause and that the decis ion be modified as here inaf te r suggested, 
for the r e a s o n s and upon the following grounds: 
1. The decis ion of this Court to sus ta in the d i s m i s s a l with 
pre judice by the Dis t r i c t Court is based upon inadequate informat ion, 
and in p a r t upon e r roneous information i n s e r t e d in the previous t r i a l 
r e c o r d . 
2. D i s m i s s a l with pre judice should not be used except as a 
l a s t r e s o r t and it should not be used at a l l whe re i ts imposi t ion would 
work subs tan t ia l in jus t ice . In this c a se , d i s m i s s a l does work substant ia l 
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in just ice to the Defendant, Counter Cla imant , Appellant . 
3. Despite the long per iod of t ime since the inception of this 
action and despi te the fact that Appellant moved for t r i a l in this m a t t e r 
after wait ing for the cour t to set the t r i a l date and despi te the fact that 
Appellant has evidence that Plaintiff owes h im, ins tead of the r e v e r s e 
the Defendant, Counter Claimant , Appellant has not had h is day in 
cour t and has been denied the opportunity to p r e s e n t to the cour t the 
evidence which suppor ts h is counter c la im, even though he has expended 
much p e r s o n a l effort and funds to this end. 
WHEREFORE, Pet i t ioner respectful ly submits that a r ehea r ing 
should be had and the decis ion r e v i s e d , believing that a r e - e x a m i n a t i o n of 
the r e c o r d wi l l a s s i s t the cour t be t te r to unders tand the r e c o r d cer t i f ied, 
and the per t inen t facts h e r e t o and wi l l r e s u l t in a r ev i s ion and r e v e r s a l 
of the decis ion r e n d e r e d by the Dis t r i c t Court in d i smi s s ing this act ion 
with p re jud ice . 
Respectful ly submit ted, 
C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN AND 
C. GLENN ROBERTSON 
A' 
/ \ .- . 
By / V I, -J - ., •••• 
' C- R i c h a r d H e n d r i k s e n 
A t t o r n e y s for P e t i t i o n e r 
- 2 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.




THE DECISION OF THIS COURT TO SUSTAIN THE 
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN DISMISSING 
THIS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE IS BASED UPON 
INADEQUATE INFORMATION AND IN PART UPON 
ERRONEOUS INFORMATION. 
In 1968, this cour t r e v e r s e d a decis ion of the lower court awarding 
judgment in this m a t t e r to the Plaintiff he re in . That decis ion, r e p o r t e d 
in 20 Ut 2d 427, 439 P . 2d 283 was based upon the fact that inadequate 
informat ion exis ted in the r e c o r d s of the t r i a l cour t . The decis ion of the 
t r i a l cour t at that t ime was based upon, supposedly, an audit p r e p a r e d 
f rom the r e c o r d s of the Rel iance National Life Insu rance Company, 
Plaintiff he re in . Based upon that audit r e p o r t , judgment was granted for 
Plaintiff and aga ins t Defendant in the amount of $6, 762. 00. The audit 
ac tual ly shows that the re was a balance due Defendant from Plaintiff. 
The audit , using a cut off date of December 31, 1956, shows a balance due 
to Defendant of $7, 629. 27. Adjusting that audit with an ending date of 
August 20, 1956, the date that Mr . Caine actual ly left the employ of 
Plaintiff, the amount due Mr . Caine is $6 ,562 .26 . This indica tes that 
Defendant does have a legi t imate c la im and that the re is on the r e c o r d 
evidence support ing his posi t ion. 
- 3 -
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It was a rgued by Plaintiff and Respondent he r e in in the lower 
cour t that the per iod of t ime since the or ig ina l filing of this action was 
so prolonged that they would be handicapped incollect ing the r e c o r d s 
n e c e s s a r y to support their posi t ion. There was no evidence p r e s e n t e d 
that a s e a r c h for r e c o r d s had been made and that such r e c o r d s did not 
exis t . Al l we have is the ba re s t a tement of counse l for Plaintiff and 
Respondent that a handicap would exis t . It s e e m s s t range that the 
Plaintiff and Respondent , who has the p r i m e respons ib i l i ty in going fo r -
wa rd in this m a t t e r , and a l so has the respons ib i l i ty under law of m a i n -
taining adequate life i n s u r a n c e r e c o r d s of thei r i n su reds and f inancial 
t r a n s a c t i o n s , should be h e a r d to complain that the r e c o r d s don' t ex is t 
or that they cannot be found or that i t would be difficult to find them. 
The r e c o r d h e r e i n contains the audit and that informat ion is avai lable 
to the cour t . A copy of the pe r t inen t pages showing compar i s ion between 
the commiss ions allowed and the commiss ions e a r n e d upon examinat ion 
is a t tached he re to as Exhibit I and Exhibit II. 
POINT II 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD NOT BE USED 
E X C E P T AS A LAST RESORT AND IT SHOULD NOT BE 
USED AT A L L WHERE ITS IMPOSITION WOULD WORK 
SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE. IN THIS CASE, DISMIS-
SAL DOES WORK SUBSTANTIAL INJUSTICE TO THE 
DEFENDANT, COUNTER CLAIMANT, A P P E L L A N T . 
- 4 -
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D i s m i s s a l with prejudice is an e x t r e m e r e m e d y and should not 
be lightly used by the cour t and not at a l l when it wil l work subs tan t ia l 
in jus t ice . 
It is genera l ly recognized that d i s m i s s a l with prejudice of a 
cause of act ion by the court is an ex t r eme ly h a r s h sanction which should 
be r e s o r t e d to only in e x t r e m e c a s e s . In Canada v. Mathews , 499 F . 2d 
253, 255 (5th Cir . 1971) the cour t ruled: 
. . . (D) i smissa l with pre judice is w a r r a n t e d only in ex t r eme 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s and only after the T r i a l Court , in the exe rc i s e 
of i ts unquestionable author i ty to control i ts own docket , has 
r e s o r t e d to "the wide range of l e s s e r sanct ions which it may 
impose upon the l i t igant or the de re l i c t a t to rney , or both. ,! 
The Utah Supreme Court has had only l imi ted occasion to ru le on this 
i s s u e , but has genera l ly followed the major i ty of c a s e s that hold that a 
d i s m i s s a l should be pe rmi t t ed only in the fact of a c lear r e c o r d of willful 
default or delay on the p a r t of one pa r ty where other sanct ions and r e m e d i e s 
a r e insufficient. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of C r y s t a l Lime and Cement Co. 
v. Robbins , 8 Ut 2d 389, 335 P. 2d 624 (1959) hea rd a s imi l a r a rgument 
when the Utah Supreme Court r e v e r s e d a lower cour t ' s d i s m i s s a l of 
Plaintiff1 s Complaint for fa i lure to p r o s e c u t e . In that ca se , after a 
lapse of a lmos t nine y e a r s , the cour t said: 
Since any pa r ty to this action could have obtained the rel ief 
to which it was enti t led at any t ime it wanted, but both pa r t i e s 
chose to dally for a number of y e a r s , it was an abuse of 
d i sc re t ion for the court to gran t a Respondent ' s motion to 
d i s m i s s with pre jud ice . (Emphasis added) 
In another Utah Supreme Court c a se , Howard v. Howard , 11 Ut 2d 149, 
356 P. 2d 275, (I960), the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval the 
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C r y s t a l Lime (infra) case in a m a t t e r where a motion for a new t r i a l 
by the Defendant lay do rman t for fifteen months before it was cal led up 
for hea r ing . In the case of Vonjonora v. D r a p e r , 30 Ut 2d 364, 517 P . 2d 
1322 (1974), the Utah Supreme Court a l so r e v e r s e d as an abuse of d i s -
c re t ion a cour t o rde r d i smis s ing Plaintiff1 s Complaint for fa i lure to 
p r o s e c u t e . In that c a s e , although it involved a change of counsel , 
n e a r l y th ree and one-half y e a r s had e lapsed after the filing of the 
Complaint and Defendant 's motion to d i s m i s s . 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of West inghouse E l e c t r i c Supply 
Company v. Pau l W. L a r s o n Cont rac tor Inc. , et a l . , 544 P . 2d 876, the 
cour t had this to say: 
It is not to be doubted that in o rde r to handle the bus iness 
of the cour t with efficiency and expedition the T r i a l Court 
should have a reasonab le lati tude of d i sc re t ion in d i s m i s s i n g 
for fa i lure to p rosecu te if a pa r ty fails to move forward 
according to the r u l e s and the d i rec t ions of the cour t without 
just if iable excuse , but that p re roga t ive falls shor t of un-
reasonab le and a r b i t a r y act ion which wi l l r e su l t in in jus t ice . 
Whether there is such justif iable excuse is to be de t e rmined 
by cons ider ing m o r e fac tors than m e r e l y the length of t ime 
since the suit was filed. Some cons idera t ion should be 
given to the conduct of both p a r t i e s and to the opportunity 
each has had to move the case forward and what they have 
done about it; and a l so what difficulty or pre judice may 
have been caused to the other s ide; and mos t impor tan t 
whether injust ice may r e s u l t f rom the d i s m i s s a l . 
The cour t commented on the obligation of both s ides to move forward 
in the following language: 
F u r t h e r , we a r e not i m p r e s s e d that Defendants t hemse lves 
we re over ly dil igent or manifes t any pa r t i cu l a r has te in 
getting the p r e - t r i a l d i scovery p r o c e d u r e s completed and 
on with the t r i a l . They did not do so in r e spons ive act ion 
to Wes t inghouse ' s having a s s e m b l e d r e c o r d s , nor did they 
seek any a s s i s t a n c e f rom the court . 
- 6 -
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I t i s indeed commendable to handle c a s e s with d ispatch and 
move the ca lendars with expedition in o r d e r to keep them 
up to date but i t i s even m o r e impor tan t to keep in mind the 
v e r y r e a s o n for the exis tance of cour t s i s to afford disputants 
an opportunity to be h e a r d and to do jus t ice between them. 
In conformity with that p r i n c i p l e , the cour t s genera l ly tend 
to favor grant ing re l ief f rom default judgment where there 
is any r easonab le excuse , unless it wil l r e su l t in subs tan t ia l 
pre judice or injust ice to the adve r se par ty . 
It is our conclusion that the T r i a l Court failed to give p rope r 
weight to the higher p r io r i ty ; and that under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
de sc r i bed h e r e i n , the o rde r of d i s m i s s a l was an abuse of d i s -
cre t ion . (Emphas is added) 
In the C r y s t a l Lime c a s e , supra , the cour t made the same point in the 
following language: 
It can, t he re fo re , ha rd ly be reasonably a rgued that they 
we re h a r r a s s e d and annoyed by Appel lan t ' s action in failing 
to draw and p r e s e n t to the cour t Findings of Fac t , Con-
clusions of Law and Decree embodying the decis ion of the 
cour t grant ing them the amount they c la imed when they 
had it in the i r power at a l l t imes to obtain re l ief by t hem-
se lves p resen t ing such findings and de c r e e to the cour t 
for i ts signing. 
The F e d e r a l Cour ts have looked to s i m i l a r p rob lems and have 
r e m a r k e d upon the quest ion of d i s m i s s a l with prejudice in s e v e r a l c a s e s . 
In Independant Product ions Corpora t ion v. Loew's Inc. , 283 F . 2d 730 
(2nd Cir . I960), the cour t commented: 
D i s m i s s a l of act ion with prejudice or en t ry of judgment 
by default a r e d r a s t i c r e m e d i e s and should be applied only 
in e x t r e m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
In final ana lys i s , a court has the respons ib i l i ty to do 
jus t ice between man and man , and g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s 
cannot justify denia l of a p a r t y ' s fair day in court except 
upon a s e r ious showing of willful default. (Emphasis 
added) 
- 7 -
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See a l so De Cuba v. PRC P i c t u r e s , 176 F . 2d 93 (2nd Cir . 1949) 
( d i s m i s s a l with pre judice se t as ide) . 
In Hassenf lu v. Pyke , 491 F . 2d 1094 (5th Ci r . 1974), the cour t 
found that the d i s m i s s a l of Plaintiff1 s Complaint with pre judice was 
essen t i a l ly punishing t h e Plaintiff and despi te f lagrant misconduct by 
Plaint iff ' s counsel , r e v e r s e d the lower cour t d i s m i s s a l . Thus the 
cour t s have continually held a d i s m i s s a l with pre judice as a d r a s t i c 
and an e x t r e m e m e a s u r e that should be taken only as a l a s t r e s o r t when 
a l l o ther efforts have failed. See a l so , Mann v. M e r r i l l , Lynch, P i e r c e , 
F e n n e r , and Smith , 488 F . 2d 75 (5th Ci r . 1973) and Reizakis v. Loy, 
490 F . 2 d 1132 (4th Ci r . 1973). 
In the case of Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F . 2d 269 (10th Cir . 1963), 
in r e v e r s i n g the D i s t r i c t Cour t ' s d i s m i s s a l pursuan t to Rule 41(b), the 
cour t s ta ted: 
The law favors the disposi t ion of l i t igation on i ts m e r i t s . 
D i s m i s s a l is a h a r s h thing and should be r e s o r t e d to only 
in e x t r e m e c a s e s . (Emphas is added) 
See a l so , Syracuse Broadcas t ing Corpora t ion v. Newhouse , 271 F . 2d 
910 (2nd Cir . 1959). 
In the prev ious cons idera t ion of this case before this cour t , 
as r e p o r t e d in 439 P . 2d 283, 20 Ut 2d 427, Chief Jus t i ce Crocket t , 
concuring specia l ly in the decis ion , had this to say: 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , no ru le should be so absolute as to apply 
even where it works an obvious in jus t ice . Due to the 
p a r t i c u l a r fact s i tuat ion in this case where there have 
been a number of hea r ings over a per iod of about seven 
y e a r s before the judgment was en te red ; where the re 
a r e e s s e n t i a l i s s u e s which it is imposs ib le to review 
- 8 -
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p r o p e r l y because of the unsa t i s fac tory s ta te of the r e c o r d s ; 
and where this s i tuat ion appea r s to be l a rge ly due to the 
fault of the Plaintiff, I ag ree that the ends of jus t ice 
wil l be bes t s e r v e d by remanding the case for t r i a l . 
(Emphas is added) 
POINT III 
DESPITE TH LONG PERIOD OF TIME SINCE THE 
INCEPTION OF THIS ACTION AND DESPITE THE FACT 
THAT A P P E L L A N T MOVED FOR TRIAL IN THIS 
, MATTER A F T E R WAITING FOR THE COURT TO SET 
THE TRIAL DATE AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT 
A P P E L L A N T HAS EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF OWES 
HIM, INSTEAD O F THE REVERSE, THE DEFENDANT, 
COUNTER CLAIMANT, A P P E L L A N T HAS NOT HAD 
HIS DAY IN COURT AND HAS BEEN DENIED THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT TO THE COURT THE 
EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS HIS COUNTER CLAIM, 
EVEN THOUGH HE HAS EXPENDED MUCH PERSONAL 
E F F O R T AND FUNDS TO THIS END. 
J a m e s E . Caine, the Defendant, Counter Cla imant , Appel lant , 
has pe r sona l ly expended much t ime , effort and money in o rde r to move 
this case along as fast a s poss ib le . He has consulted with, in this m a t t e r , 
at l e a s t twelve a t to rneys p r io r to his p r e s e n t counsel . He has paid to 
those a t to rneys approx imate ly $6, 000. 00. He has paid out approx imate ly 
$650. 00 in telephone bil ls for long d is tance ca l l s to his a t to rneys . He 
- 9 -
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h a s m a d e t r i p s to S a l t L a k e Ci ty f r o m out of the s t a t e , to c o n s u l t w i t h 
h i s a t t o r n e y s and h a s p a i d a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 3 , 600 . 00 for t h o s e t r i p s . 
He h a s p a i d $200. 00 to a n a c c o u n t a n t in t h i s m a t t e r . T h i s t o t a l s in 
e x c e s s of $10, 000 . 00 t h a t M r . C a i n e h a s e x p e n d e d in a v a i n a t t e m p t to 
b r i n g b e f o r e the c o u r t h i s s i d e of t h i s m a t t e r and to r e c e i v e an a d j u d i c a t i o n 
on the m e r i t s . O v e r the y e a r s , h i s a c t i v i t y b r e a k s down in t h i s m a n n e r : 
1968 8 p h o n e c a l l s s u p p o r t e d by r e c o r d s . 
1969 8 phone c a l l s s u p p o r t e d by r e c o r d s . 
1970 1 phone c a l l but f e e l s h e m a d e o t h e r s for w h i c h r e c o r d s 
a r e l o s t . 
1971 He h a s found no r e c o r d s bu t f e e l s t h a t he m a d e m a n y . 
1972 10 phone c a l l s s u p p o r t e d by r e c o r d s . 
1973 8 phone c a l l s s u p p o r t e d by r e c o r d s . 
1974 R e c o r d s i n c o m p l e t e bu t f e e l s t h a t he m a d e m a n y c a l l s . 
1975 A p p r o x i m a t e l y 40 phone c a l l s . 
T h e s e c a l l s w e r e m a d e to h i s a t t o r n e y s in e a c h i n s t a n c e a s k i n g for 
i n f o r m a t i o n , r e q u e s t i n g t h e m to m o v e a h e a d , o f f e r ing a s s i s t a n c e , o r 
a n y t h i n g he cou ld do to b r i n g t h i s m a t t e r b e f o r e the c o u r t . 
M r . C a i n e r e q u e s t e d f r o m the County C l e r k i n f o r m a t i o n a s to 
a t r i a l d a t e on two s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s a n d w a s to ld he w o u l d be no t i f i ed 
of a t r i a l d a t e a n d w a s a s s u r e d t ha t t h e r e w a s no p r o b l e m . It i s n o r m a l 
p r o c e d u r e in the Sa l t L a k e Coun ty C l e r k ' s of f ice , upon r e c e i v i n g a c a s e 
upon r e m a n d for a new t r i a l , to s e t a d a t e for s u c h new t r i a l , in c o n -
s u l t a t i o n w i t h the r e s p e c t i v e a t t o r n e y s , upon t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e . In 
t h i s c a s e , t h i s w a s n o t d o n e . 
The U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e a r e s i l e n t upon t h i s po in t . 
T h e r e i s n o r e q u i r e d p r o c e d u r e to follow upon the r e m a n d of a c a s e 
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for a new t r i a l . The r u l e s do not place the respons ib i l i ty for going 
fo rward upon any pa r ty . The r u l e s a l so a r e s i lent a s to what the 
C le rk should do in the m a t t e r . As indicated above, the Salt Lake 
County C le rk has ini t ia ted a p rocedure to follow in the absence of 
any ru le covering this s i tuat ion. In this s i tuat ion, the Appellant has 
been penal ized in a s i tuat ion for which the re a r e no r u l e s . 
As has been indicated in the ca se s cited above, d i s m i s s a l with 
pre judice should not be used where injust ice would r e s u l t . In this c a s e , 
in just ice would s u r e l y r e s u l t . If the d i s m i s s a l is al lowed to s tand, the 
Plaintiff i s r ewa rded because of i ts d i l a to ry action and the Defendant is 
punished because of the non-act ion of his a t t o rneys . What m o r e can an 
individual do to move his cause forward than M r . Caine has done in 
this m a t t e r . 
ARGUMENT 
In this m a t t e r , t he re has never been an adequate p resen ta t ion of 
t e s t imony and exibi ts and evidence before a t r i a l cour t in o rde r that a 
judgment might be r e n d e r e d on the m e r i t s . The decis ion of the Utah 
Supreme Court p rev ious ly r e f e r r e d to in this m a t t e r in 1968 r e v e r s e d the 
decis ion of the T r i a l Court for that ve ry r e a s o n . That insufficiency of 
evidence appea red , in the r e c o r d s , to sus ta in the judgment of the cour t . 
At this t ime , the cour t has sus ta ined a d i s m i s s a l with pre judice because 
insufficient evidence has been p re sen t ed before the T r i a l Court and the 
c la im is made that it would be difficult to obtain the evidence. No 
evidence was p r e sen t ed to indicate that the r e c o r d s and the facts had been 
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sought after and could not be found, no evidence i s in the r e c o r d s to 
indicate that s e a r c h was made by the Plaintiff corpora t ion of the i r files 
and r e c o r d s to a s c e r t a i n what informat ion exis ted , no informat ion was 
p r e s e n t e d which i t emized the def ic iencies in the r e c o r d which could not 
be c o r r e c t e d in this m a t t e r . This m a t t e r should be sent back to the 
T r i a l Cour t for t r i a l . If i t develops that some of the m a t t e r s at i s sue 
cannot be r e so lved because of inadequate ev idenc ia ry m a t e r i a l , a t l eas t 
a t that point a decis ion could be made as to whether or not this case 
could be p rope r ly adjudicated, or not decided at a l l due to a lack of 
evidence or non-avai lab i l i ty of evidence. No effort has been made to 
do this up to this t ime . 
In this m a t t e r , the Defendant has made eve ry p e r s o n a l effort to 
move this case along as indicated above. He has kept ve ry close p e r -
sonal contact with his a t to rneys over the y e a r s , asking for t r i a l d a t e s , 
urging that the case be moved along, expending money in legal r e s e a r c h , 
and in having the file rev iewed by var ious a t to rneys with a view of hir ing 
them to move the m a t t e r forward . At a l l t imes the Defendant was eager 
to go fo rward with this m a t t e r and was willing to do whatever was n e c e s -
s a r y in o rde r to swiftly complete the adjudication of the m a t t e r s at i s s u e . 
It i s i n t e re s t ing to note that the re is absolute ly no p r o c e d u r e out-
l ined in the Utah Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e governing what act ion should 
be taken by the p a r t i e s and by the Cle rk of the Court when a case is r e -
manded for a new t r i a l . The re is a hiatus in the law and in the Rules of 
Civil P r o c e d u r e . How is i t poss ib le to penal ize a pa r ty for not doing what 
the r u l e s do not r e q u i r e h im to do nor i n s t r u c t h im to do nor indeed to 
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allow him to do. 
After waiting for the cour t to act and after having been a s s u r e d 
that a t r i a l date would be set and that the ma t t e r would go forward , 
Defendant made r eques t that a t r i a l date be set . The Defendant was 
moving the m a t t e r forward as bes t he knew how. After reques t ing a 
t r i a l date and a t tempt ing to move the m a t t e r forward , Plaintiff, who 
had made no moves a t a l l and had pe r fo rmed no action to move this 
m a t t e r fo rward , then moved the cour t for a d i s m i s s a l with prejudice 
because the Defendant had not moved m o r e rap id ly to do that which 
Plaintiff a l so had not done. The Dis t r i c t Court , by grant ing Plaintiff 's 
motion to d i s m i s s with pre judice in effect r ewarded the Plaintiff for 
the i r inact ion and penal ized the Defendant for his act ion. 
Some of the m a t e r i a l p re sen ted to the T r i a l Court in the t r i a l 
which was r e v e r s e d by this cour t in 1968, was e r r o n e o u s . Information 
p r e sen t ed to the cour t at that t ime indicated that Defendant owed Plaintiff 
a ce r ta in sum of money. The sudit made by an independant and d i s in -
t e r e s t e d cer t i f ied public accountant indica tes that in fact money was owed 
by Plaintiff to Defendant. Plaintiff is aware of this audit and it is to the 
i n t e r e s t of the Plaintiff to have this m a t t e r d i s m i s s e d so that this m a t t e r 
could not be adjudicated and the poss ible finding made which wil l obligate 
Plaintiff to pay to Defendant a sum of money. Plaintiff, in the words of 
Plaint iff ' s a t to rney before the lower cour t , in asking for d i s m i s s a l said 
that both s ides had s lept on their r igh ts in this m a t t e r . If we w e r e to 
admi t , a rguendo, that that s t a tement is a c c u r a t e , then the act ion of 
the lower cour t in d i smi s s ing , and of the Supreme Court in sustaining 
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that d i s m i s s a l , r e w a r d s the Plaintiff for s leeping on i t s r igh ts but 
punishes the Defendant for pe r sona l ly exer t ing eve ry effort to obtain his 
day in cour t . 
The c a s e s abound which indicate that d i s m i s s a l with pre judice 
is a h a r s h and e x t r e m e r e m e d y and should be used only in e x t r e m e ca se s 
and should not be used where it would work a subs tan t ia l injust ice aga ins t 
one pa r ty . The c a s e s indicate that where both p a r t i e s a r e equally to 
b l a m e , one pa r ty should not be r e w a r d e d for that s i tuat ion. The ca se s 
indicate that it is the purpose and function of the cour t s to hear m a t t e r s 
and decide them and not to d i s m i s s them except where no other r e c o u r s e 
is r easonab ly avai lable to them. In this m a t t e r , the Defendant has been 
eager to go forward but he has been f ru s t r a t ed by no action. The Plaintiff 
has not been eager to go forward . If the re be any fault in not going forward , 
the re should not be a r e w a r d to the one pa r ty and a punishment to the 
other pa r ty for ident ica l act ion or the lack of it. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submi ts that jus t ice wil l bes t be s e rved by r e v e r s i n g the 
decis ion of the lower cour t and set t ing this m a t t e r for t r i a l . 
Such act ion would ce r ta in ly be cons is tan t with the p r io r dec is ions 
of this cour t in the ca s e s ci ted above and with the dec is ions of the F e d e r a l 
Cour t a l so ci ted above. 
Such act ion would a l so allow the Defendant his day in cour t , which 
he rightfully d e s e r v e s , and wi l l avoid the r e s u l t of r eward ing the Plaintiff 
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for his lack of act ion, and punishing the Defendant for his act ion. 
Respectful ly submit ted, 
C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN AND 
C. GLENN ROBERTSON 
\ . . | 
,-> '* \-
By \ . ^ C. R icha rd Hendr iksen 
At to rneys for Pe t i t ioner 
-15-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T DECEIVED X
^ W LIBRARY 
1 
C" 
J. Reu&ca ea; 
.1977 
Schoo/ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
